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UDGEMENT is an instrument for all subjects, and medleth every where,
and
therefore the Essayes I make of it, there is no maner of occasion I
seek
not to employ therein. If it be a subject I understand not my selfe,
therein
I make triall of it, sounding afarre off the depth of the ford, and
finding
the same over deepe for my reach, I keepe my selfe on the shoare. And
to
acknowledge not to be able to wade through is a part of its effect, yea
of such whereof he vanteth most. If I light upon a vaine and idle
subject,
I assaye to trie and endevour to see whether I may find a good ground
to
worke upon, and matter to frame a body, and wherewith to build and
under-lay
it. Sometimes I addresse my judgement and contrive it to a noble and
out-
worn subject, wherein is nothing found subsisting of itselfe, the high
way to it being so bare-trodden that it cannot march but in other
steps.
There he pleaseth himselfe in chusing the course he thinkes best, and a
thousand paths sometimes he saith, this or that was best chosen. I take
my first Argument of fortune: All are alike unto me: And I never
purpose
to handle them throughly: For there is nothing wherein I can perceive
the
full perfection: Which they doe not that promise to shew it us. Of a
hundred
parts and visages that every thing hath, I take one, which sometimes I
slightly runne over, and other times but cursorily glance at. And yet
other
whilst I pinch it to the quicke and give it a Stockado, not the
widest, but the deepest I can. And for the most part I love to seize
upon
them by some unwonted lustre. I would adventure to treat and discourse
of some matter to the depth; knew I my selfe lesse, or were I deceived
in mine owne impuissance; scattering here one and there another word,
scantlings
taken from their maine groundwork, disorderly dispersed without any
well-grounded
designe and promise. I am not bound to make it good, nor without
varying
to keepe my selfe close-tied unto it; whensoever it shall please me to
yeeld my selfe to doubt, to uncertaintie, and to my Mistris's forme,
which
is ignorance. Each motion sheweth and discovereth what we are. The very
same minde of Cæsar we see in directing, marshalling, and
setting the battel of Pharsalia, is likewise seene to order,
dispose,
and contrive idle, trifling and amorous devices. We judge of a horse
not
only by seeing him ridden, and cunningly managed, but also by seeing
him
trot or pace; yea, if we but looke upon him as he stands in the stable.
Amongst the functions of the soule, some are but meane and base. He
that
seeth her no further, can never know her thorowly. And he that seeth
her
march her naturall and simple pace, doth peradventure observe her best.
The winds or passions take her most in her highest pitch, seeing she
entirely
coucheth herselfe upon every matter, and wholy therein exerciseth
herselfe:
and handleth but one at once, not according to it, but according to
herselfe.
Things severall in themselves have peradventure weight, measure, and
condition:
But inwardly, in us, she cuts it out for them, as she understandeth the
same herselfe. Death is fearefull and ugly unto Cicero; wished
for
and desired of Cato; and indifferent unto Socrates.
Health,
wellfare, conscience, authoritie, riches, glorie, beautie, and their
contraries
are dispoyled at the entrance, and receive a new vesture at the soules
hand. Yea, and what coulour she pleaseth: browne, bright, greene, sad,
or any hew else; sharpe or sweete, deepe or superficiall, and what each
of them pleaseth. For none of them did ever verifie their stiles, their
rules, or formes in common; each one severally is a Queene in her owne
estate. Therefore let us take no more excuses from externall qualities
of things. To us it belongeth to give our selves accoumpt of it. Our
good
and our evil hath no dependancy but from our selves. Let us offer our
vowes
and offerings unto it, and not to fortune. She hath no power over our
manners.
Why should I not judge of Alexander as I am sitting and
drinking
at table, and talking in good company? Or if hee were playing at
Chesse,
what string of his wit doth not tone or harpe on this fond-childish and
time-consuming play? I lothe and shun it, only because there is no
sport
enough in it, and that in his recreation he is over serious with us,
being
ashamed I must apply the attention therunto as might be imployed on
some
good subject. He was no more busied in levying his forces and preparing
for his glorious passage into India; nor this other in disintangling
and
discovering of a passage whence dependeth the well-fare and safety of
mankind.
See how much our mind troubleth this ridiculous ammuzing, if all her
sinnewes
bandy not. How amply she giveth every one Law in that to know and
directly
to judge of himselfe. I doe not more universally view and feele my
selfe
in any other posture. What passion doth not exercise us therunto.
Choller,
spight, hatred, impatience, and vehement ambition to overcome, in a
matter
wherein it were haply more excusable to be ambitious for to be
vanquished.
For a rare pre-excellence, and beyond the common reach, in so frivolous
a thing, is much mis-seeming a man of honour. What I say of this
example
may be spoken of all others. Every parcell, every occupation of a man,
accuseth and sheweth him equal unto another. Democritus and
Heraclitus were two Philosophers, the first of which, finding and
deeming
humane
condition to be vaine and ridiculous, did never walke abroad but with a
laughing, scorneful and mocking countenance: Whereas Heraclitus, taking
pitie and compassion of the very same condition of ours, was
continually
seene with a sad, mournfull, and heavie cheere, and with teares
trickling
downe his blubbered eyes.
-- Alter Ridebat quoties a limine
moverat
unum Protuleratque pedem, flebat
contrarius
alter. Juven. Sat. x. 28.
One from his doore,
his
foote no sooner past,
But straight he taught; the
other
wept as fast.
I like the
first
humor best, not because it is more pleasing to laugh than to weepe; but
for it is more disdainfull, and doth more condemne us than the other.
And
me thinkes we can never bee sufficiently despised according to our
merit.
Bewailing and commiseration are commixed with some estimation of the
thing
moaned and wailed. Things scorned and contemned are thought to be of no
worth. I cannot be perswaded there can be so much ill lucke in us as
there
is apparant vanitie, nor so much malice as sottishnesse. We are not so
full of evil as of voydnesse and inanitie. We are not so miserable as
base
and abject. Even so Diogenes, who did nothing but trifle, toy,
and
dally with himself, in rumbling and rowing of his tub, and flurting at Alexander,
accompting us but flies and bladders puft with winde, was a more
sharpe,
a more bitter, and a more stinging judge, and by consequence more just
and fitting my humor than Timon, surnamed the hater of all mankinde.
For
looke what a man hateth, the same thing he takes to hart. Timon wisht
all
evill might light on us: He was passionate in desiring our ruine. He
shunned
and loathed our conversation as dangerous and wicked, and of a depraved
nature: Whereas the other so little regarded us, that we could neither
trouble nor alter him by our contagion; he forsooke our company, not
for
feare, but for disdaine of our commerce: He never thought us capable or
sufficient to doe either good or evill. Of the same stampe was the
answer
of Statilius, to whom Brutus spake to win him to take
part,
and adhere to the conspiracie against Cæsar: He allowed
the
enterprize to be very just, but disalowed of the men that should
performe
the same, as unworthy that any man would put himself in any adventure
for
them: Conformable to the discipline of Hegesias, who said, That
a man ought never to doe anything but for himself; forasmuch as he
alone
is worthy to have any action performed for him: and to that of Theodorus,who
thought it an injustice that a wise man would in any case hazard
himselfe
for the good and benefit of his countrie, or to endanger his wisdome
for
fooles. Our owne condition is as ridiculous as risible, as much to be
laught
at as able to laugh.